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INTRODUCTION

The 2016–2017 Survey of Florida Cases Affecting Business Owners
reviews Florida appellate court decisions involving state tax and other
business law matters.1 While the cases that have been included are mostly
from 2016 through June of 2017, several important 2015 cases have been
included.2
Part II provides analysis of appellate cases where the courts were
presented with disputes by and among the business, its owners and their
transferees, and its key employees, whether sounding in tort, contract,
statutory law, or a combination thereof.3
Part III considers litigation with third parties starting with several
important state tax cases involving constitutional and procedural issues of
note.4 Cases arising in and out of the ordinary course of business, again,
*
Associate Professor of Taxation and Business Law, Master of Taxation
and Master of Accounting Programs, H. Wayne Huizenga School of Business and
Entrepreneurship, Nova Southeastern University; B.A., New York University; J.D., New York
Law School; LL.M. (Tax), New York University School of Law.
1.
See infra Parts I–II.
2.
See infra Parts II–III.
3.
See infra Part II.
4.
See infra Part III.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/2

2

Landau: 2016-2017 Survey of Florida Cases Affecting Business Owners

2017]

2016-2017 SURVEY OF FLORIDA CASES

3

whether sounding in tort, contract, or statutory law—other than tax—or a
combination follow.5
II.
A.

CORPORATIONS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND
PARTNERSHIPS: DIVORCES OF ONE TYPE OR ANOTHER

Officers and Directors Liability
1.

Director and Officer Liability Policy: Insured Versus Insured
Exclusion

Mr. Durant, a shareholder of Bonifay Holding Company, Inc.
(“Corporation”), was formerly a director of Corporation.6 Mr. James, at all
times relevant to this case, was Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and
President of Corporation.7 Mr. Durant previously sold his stock back to
Corporation8 but later repurchased the stock.9 After the repurchase, Mr.
Durant brought and prevailed in an action against Mr. James, which alleged
overvaluation of the repurchased stock.10 Mr. Durant attempted to collect the
money judgment awarded in that action—of more than $1 million—by
seeking a writ of garnishment against the directors and officers under a
policy issued by Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (“Insurance
Company”), which insured the Corporation’s directors and officers.11
Insurance Company counterclaimed and sought a declaration that the claim
was not covered by the policy.12 The policy contained an insured versus
insured coverage exclusion (“Exclusion”), whereby Insurance Company was
not required to pay claims by one [i]nsured [p]erson against another
[i]nsured [p]erson for a [w]rongful [a]ct,13 subject to two exceptions set forth
in the policy.14 The Exclusion did not apply to claims based upon an
insured’s employment or for contribution or indemnification of otherwise
covered claims.15 Mr. Durant argued that his suit against Mr. James was not
undertaken “as a director or [as a] former . . . director, . . . but [rather] in his
5.
See id.
6.
Durant v. James, 189 So. 3d 993, 995 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
7.
Id.
8.
Id. Mr. Durant was required by the judgment of dissolution entered in his
divorce to sell his stock in Corporation. Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. at 995 & n.1.
15.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995 n.1.
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[individual] capacity,” and the writ sought was based on damages awarded to
him under a “judgment unrelated to his former director position.”16 Both
Insurance Company and Mr. Durant filed motions seeking summary
declaratory judgment; the trial court granted summary judgment to Insurance
Company and Mr. Durant appealed.17 The Exclusion provided that “[t]he
insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for [l]oss in connection with
any [c]laim by or at the behest of the Company, or any affiliate of the
Company or any [i]nsured [p]erson”—the balance of the provision being the
two exceptions mentioned above.18 Insured persons were defined in the
policy as “any past, present or future director, trustee, officer . . . of the
Company,” and the definition of claim contained in the policy was “any
demand ‘against an [i]nsured [p]erson for a [w]rongful [a]ct;’” there was no
disagreement as to these definitions.19 The district court, noting that the fact
that Mr. Durant and Mr. James were both insured persons was not contested,
concluded that Mr. Durant failed to bring himself within the policy’s express
exceptions to the Exclusion, nor was he acting in furtherance of some
statutory duty.20 The First District Court of Appeal in Durant v. James21
considered the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Rigby v.
Underwriters at Lloyd’s22 and concluded that Rigby was distinguishable from
the case before the First District Court of Appeal.23 Rigby involved a trustee
in bankruptcy added to a previously issued director and officer liability
policy as an insured person, and specifically named in the amended
definition of the term director in the policy.24 The Third District Court of
Appeal in Rigby held that the Exclusion did not apply to the trustee in
bankruptcy acting in furtherance of statutory duties of the trustee under
federal bankruptcy statutes and suing other directors—on behalf of
creditors.25 The Third District Court of Appeal in Rigby held that the
bankruptcy trustee “did not bring the adversary action acting as an officer or
16.
Id. at 995.
17.
Id. at 994–95.
18.
Id. at 995 n.1.
19.
Id. at 995.
20.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995–96. The First District Court of Appeal
distinguished the facts before it from the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in
Rigby v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s—involving a trustee in bankruptcy acting in furtherance of
the duties of the trustee under federal bankruptcy statutes. Id.; see also Rigby v. Underwriters
at Lloyd’s, 907 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
21.
189 So. 3d 993 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
22.
907 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
23.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995.
24.
Id.; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1188–89. As discussed in Durant, there was an
amendment to the definition of director in the policy involved in Rigby to include, by name,
the bankruptcy trustee. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189.
25.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995–96; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189.
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director. As a result, the insured versus insured [provision] did not apply.”26
After distinguishing Rigby, the First District Court of Appeal in Durant
noted that it was “further persuaded by the opinions of other jurisdictions,
holding that the capacity in which the claimant sued the other officer or
director in the first instance had no bearing on the bar on coverage under a
[directors and officers] policy’s insured versus insured exclusion.”27 The
First District Court of Appeal concluded that the policy did not contain any
ambiguity and there was no “lack of clarity in the terms” requiring
interpretation.28
2.

Who Is on the Board and Where Did the Corporation Go?

The dispute in Wilson v. Wilson29 stemmed from the death of
Reverend John Wilson (“Reverend”).30 The Reverend had incorporated a
number of entities.31 The initial issue in the trial court was regarding the
identities of the members of the boards of directors of those corporations
(“Corporations”).32 Before trial, the judge allowed the former personal
representative of the Reverend’s estate (“Intervenor”) to intervene.33 The
Intervenor’s position was that the various Corporations formed by the
Reverend had not operated as not-for-profit corporations, and therefore, the
Corporations’ assets were part of the Reverend’s probate estate subject to
administration.34 As to the initial issue—the identity of the board
members—the trial judge’s order stated that neither the plaintiffs nor the
defendants had proven that they were board members.35 The trial judge also
ruled, in essence, that the Corporations were to be disregarded and that the
assets were part of the Reverend’s probate estate subject to administration,
which supported the Intervenor’s position.36 On appeal, the Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the defendants were not
directors, but reversed the trial court’s decision that the plaintiffs were not
directors.37 The appellate court noted that the Corporations’ regularly filed
required annual reports identified the plaintiffs as members of the Board of
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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Durant, 189 So. 3d at 996.
Id.
211 So. 3d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id. at 315.
Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 315.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 319–20.
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Directors.38 The district court also reversed the trial court’s ruling that
effectively dissolved the Corporations—and went even further by deciding to
whom the dissolved Corporations’ assets belonged.39 Also, under the test set
out by the Supreme Court of Florida in Morgareidge v. Howey,40 the
Intervenor should not have been allowed to intervene as he had no interest of
the direct and immediate character required.41 Nor should the Intervenor
have been permitted to introduce new issues of validity of the Corporations
and of the ownership of the assets of the Corporations, as intervenors are not
allowed to introduce new issues.42
3.

Fiduciary Duties

The next case, Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc.,43 is a consolidated
appeal of two Miami-Dade County Circuit Court cases.44 In Taverna
Imports, Inc. v. Maricela Fonseca (“Case One”), the allegations included the
following: Taverna Imports, Inc. (“Corporation”) issued 4500 of its 5000
authorized shares equally to three shareholders—Mario Taverna (“Mario”),
Maricela Fonseca (“Maricela”), and Jule Laudisio (“Jule”)—when
Corporation was formed in 2002.45 Corporation, in 2005, redeemed 1000
shares from Jule,46 and at the end of January 2007, Jule agreed, in writing, to
have her remaining 500 shares redeemed for cash—with checks for the
correct amounts transmitted to her at the end of January of 2007.47 This left
Mario and Maricela as the remaining shareholders.48 Within three days after
receipt of the checks, Jule attempted to disavow the sale of her remaining
shares and she returned the checks to Corporation.49 In late February 2007,
at a formal shareholders’ meeting, Mario, the elected president of
Corporation, was purportedly ousted from that role by a vote of the
shareholders, including Jule, which ouster occurred even though the

38.
Id. at 319.
39.
Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 317–18, 320.
40.
78 So. 14 (Fla. 1918).
41.
Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 316–17 (quoting Morgareidge, 78 So. at 15).
42.
Id.
43.
212 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
44.
Id. at 434.
45.
Id. at 434–35.
46.
Id. at 435. After the 2005 redemption, 45% of the shares were owned by
Mario, 45% of the shares were owned by Maricela, and 10% of the shares were owned by
Jule. Id.
47.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 435.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
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corporate by-laws required that officers be removed by the Board of
Directors.50
Mario and Corporation sued: (1) Maricela; (2) Richard Fonseca
(“Richard”), Maricela’s husband; (3) Jule; and (4) Hans Eichmann (“Hans”),
a former member of the Board of Directors of Corporation, and an employee
and a former employee of Corporation.51 In the lawsuit, Corporation
requested a declaratory judgment declaring that the redemption of Jule’s
stock was valid and that the corporate actions taken after Jule’s stock had
been repurchased were invalid.52 Mario also sought damages for Maricela’s
alleged breach of fiduciary duty and for Richard’s alleged aiding and
abetting of Maricela’s alleged breach.53 On Corporation’s motion for partial
summary judgment, the trial court found that the redemption of Jule’s shares
was valid, that the election of a new president at the formal shareholders’
meeting was not valid, and that Mario was still president of Corporation.54
After trial, on the remaining issues, the jury awarded damages of $1,063,234
in favor of Corporation against all of the defendants for “wrongfully [taking]
corporate authority of [the Corporation], which caused [it] damages.”55 The
jury also awarded damages of $833,000 to Mario, individually, for
Maricela’s breach of fiduciary duty and Richard’s role in aiding and
abetting.56 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court
proceedings except as to the calculation of damages.57 The redemption of
Jule’s shares to Corporation was valid even though only Jule signed the
agreement, and not Corporation, since the parties had performed under the
contract.58 The fact that Jule did not cash the checks was of no legal
consequence.59 Mario’s removal as president was ineffective as it was not
done “by a majority vote of the Board of Directors.”60 The district court also
held that there was competent substantial evidence to support the jury’s
verdict that Maricela breached her fiduciary duty to Mario under section
50.
Id. at 435–36. About a month later, after a special meeting, Mario found
himself locked out of the Corporation’s warehouse, although he was subsequently let in, at
which time he discovered that Hans, the former employee and former board member, was
back and managing the business. Id. Mario was eventually terminated. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d
at 436.
51.
Id. at 434 & n.3, 437.
52.
Id. at 437.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 435, 437.
55.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 438.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 443.
58.
Id. at 440–41.
59.
See id. at 441.
60.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 441–42.
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607.0831 of the Florida Statutes.61 In addition, the court found competent
substantial evidence in support of the jury’s verdict that Maricela’s husband,
Richard, aided and abetted Maricela in breaching her fiduciary duty owed to
Mario, with the Third District Court of Appeal holding that “Florida law
recognizes a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary
duty.”62
Richard Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc.63 (“Case Two”) involved
Richard’s purchase of Bank of America’s judgments, one against
Corporation and one against Mario, but only the judgment for $110,309.36
against Corporation was before the appellate court.64 The trial judge, in Case
Two, granted Richard’s motion and allowed him to proceed as to the
purchased judgment against the Corporation—by levying and executing
against the 1000 shares redeemed by the Corporation from Jule in 2005.65
By allowing seizure of Jule’s formerly owned shares, Maricela, by way of
Richard, would own a majority interest in Corporation giving Maricela the
power to cancel Corporation’s judgments, the only remaining significant
assets of Corporation, against Maricela and Richard.66 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that under the unique circumstances of
this case “[t]he trial court . . . should have applied Richard[’s monetary]
judgment” against Corporation as an offset to Corporation’s judgments
against Maricela and Richard in Case One.67 Otherwise, control of
Corporation would be obtained for an improper purpose.68
4.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Tortious Interference: Default/The
Ultimate Sanction

In 2010, Mr. Coghlan and Ms. Del Grosso (“Individual
Plaintiffs”)—while employees, officers, directors, and shareholders of The
Bare Board Group, Inc. (“Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation”)—
allegedly lent money to Mr. Doyle, a person who, like Individual Plaintiffs
and Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation, was “in the printed computer

61.
Id. at 442; see also FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (2016).
62.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 442.
63.
212 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
64.
Id. at 434, 439 n.8, 445.
65.
Id. at 439 n.6. The district court noted that levy and execution was sought
only on the shares redeemed from Jule “given [Richard’s] position throughout the litigation
(and here on appeal) that Jule” still owned shares. Id.
66.
Id. at 445–46.
67.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 434, 445–46.
68.
Id. at 447 (citing Rowland v. Times Publ’g Co., 35 So. 2d 399, 402 (Fla.
1948)).
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circuit board industry.”69 Individual Plaintiffs allegedly knew Mr. Doyle
planned to establish a printed circuit board company, which he did in 2010,
incorporating as ICMfg & Associates, Inc. (“Plaintiff Corporation”).70
Individual Plaintiffs resigned from their officer and director positions with
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation on January 13, 2012.71 Individual
Plaintiffs had also been highly compensated employees of Defendant
Counterclaimant Corporation, but they resigned from their employment on
the same day that they resigned as officers and directors.72 They remained
shareholders of Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation, but Individual
Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Corporation73 brought a declaratory judgment action
against Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation to determine the proper
value of Individual Plaintiffs’ shares held in Defendant Counterclaimant
Corporation.74 They also sought a determination by the court because “they
were in doubt about their rights under the shareholder agreement.”75
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation answered the complaint, alleged
various affirmative defenses and, in an amended counterclaim, alleged the
following as to Individual Plaintiffs: (1) [B]reach of fiduciary duty, (2) civil
conspiracy to defraud, (3) fraud, (4) “violation of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act” (“FDUTPA”),76 and (5) “tortious interference
with business relationships;” and as to Plaintiff Corporation and Mr. Doyle,
alleged the following: (1) “[A]iding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty,”
(2) civil conspiracy to defraud, (3) violation of FDUTPA, and (4) “tortious
interference with [Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s] business
relationships.”77 The counterclaim was answered and contained affirmative
defenses.78 The trial court found that in the course of the litigation,
Individual Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Corporation (collectively “the Plaintiffs”)
had committed what amounted to fraud upon the court, and on Defendant
Counterclaimant Corporation’s motion to impose sanctions, the trial court
69.
ICMfg & Assocs. v. Bare Bd. Grp., No. 2D15-3557, slip op. at 2 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2017).
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 3.
72.
Id. at 2–3.
73.
See id. at 3. Why Plaintiff Corporation was a plaintiff in the original
declaratory judgment action is not apparent from the appellate court decision.* However,
Plaintiff Corporation and Mr. Doyle were counter-defendants as to Defendant
Counterclaimant Corporation’s counterclaims. ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 3.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. The appellate court noted that the shareholder agreement gave
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation “the first right of redemption” of Individual
Plaintiffs’ shares in the event their employment ended. Id.
76.
Id. at 3–5; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2011).
77.
ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 5.
78.
Id.
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struck the Plaintiffs’ pleadings.79 This left the Plaintiffs in the position of
having defaulted on Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s counterclaim
so that Defendant Counterclaimant did not need to establish liability on the
part of the Plaintiffs.80 The Plaintiffs argued that, notwithstanding the
default, Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation was still required to prove a
causal connection between the Plaintiffs’ conduct and Defendant
Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.81 The trial judge disagreed,
ruling that the default had established the element of causation as to all of the
Plaintiffs.82 The jury awarded substantial damages—totaling almost $10
million—to Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation based on expert
testimony, although the expert did not consider the issue of causation.83 The
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the
sanction striking Plaintiffs’ pleadings.84 The conduct of the Plaintiffs
justified the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this fashion and the
imposition of the sanction.85 However, when it came to the issue of
damages, the district court did not approve of the pre-trial ruling that the
default on the question of liability was enough to establish the nexus and
causation between the Plaintiffs’ tortious acts and Defendant
The damages were
Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.86
unliquidated and the Plaintiffs had the right to contest “the causal
relationship between the damages claimed and the liability established by the
default.”87 The district court reversed on the award of damages for lost
profits and prejudgment interest and remanded for trial on only the issue of
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.88
B.

Claims of Shareholders, Members, and Partners
1.

Statutory Appraisal Right: Valuation of Corporate Stock

The issue on appeal in this case was the proper fair market valuation
of shares of a corporation (“Corporation”) that was to be merged with

79.
Id. at 6–7.
80.
Id. at 7.
81.
Id. at 7–8.
82.
See ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 8.
83.
Id. at 9–10, 12.
84.
Id. at 22.
85.
See id. at 13.
86.
Id. at 18.
87.
ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 16 (quoting Talucci v. Matthews, 960 So. 2d
9, 10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam)).
88.
Id. at 22.
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another corporation.89 Corporation estimated the value of the dissenting
shareholder’s (“Dissenting Shareholder”) 25% interest at $420 per share,
while Dissenting Shareholder’s proposed estimate was $5,066.67 per share,
which would translate into a value for her interest in the corporation of $1.9
million.90 At trial, two expert witnesses testified as to the value of
Dissenting Shareholder’s stock, one on behalf of Corporation and one on
behalf of Dissenting Shareholder, but the judge adopted the opinion of
neither.91 Instead, the trial judge found that the fair market value of the
shares was $1.9 million, the same amount claimed by the Dissenting
Shareholder—which was more than her trial expert witness’s valuation.92
Dissenting Shareholder based her fair market value estimate “on an
independent accountant’s valuation,” but no documentation of this valuation
was produced at trial.93 The judge entered an order using the $1.9 million
amount and Corporation appealed.94 On appeal, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal stated that the trial court has discretion to: (1) appoint independent
appraisers to make a recommendation as to the fair market value,95 which the
trial judge did not do; (2) has discretion to accept one party’s expert’s
opinions, or even portions of more than one expert opinion,96 which the
judge did not do; or (3) the trial judge may “formulate an independent
valuation based on the evidence presented,” but the judge’s valuation must
be supported by substantial competent evidence.97 The appellate court said
the judge did not adopt the opinion of either appraiser, did not appoint an
independent appraiser, and did not provide an explanation as to how the
judge arrived at the $1.9 million fair market value.98 The Fifth District Court
reversed and remanded with instructions.99

89.
Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Sandhu, 207 So. 3d 981, 983
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (per curiam).
90.
Id. Dissenting Shareholder was the former spouse of one of the individual
defendants sued by Dissenting Shareholder. Id. The judgment dissolving their marriage
granted each spouse a one-half interest in the individual defendant’s one-half interest, with the
merger plan and appraisal proceeding being the outgrowth of the equitable distribution. Id.
91.
Id. at 983–84.
92.
Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 207 So. 3d at 984.
93.
Id. at 985.
94.
Id. at 984.
95.
Id. at 985 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 607.1330(4) (2013)).
96.
Id. at 986 n.7.
97.
Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 207 So. 3d at 986.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
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No Personal Liability for Repayment of Contribution to Limited
Liability Corporation

Georg Schollmeier (“Schollmeier”) agreed to a capital contribution
of $400,000 in Avrupa, LLC (“LLC”) in exchange for a 20% interest in
LLC.100 The members of LLC—Tulga Demir (“Demir”), Tugend Demir
(“Tugend”), and Schollmeier—entered into an agreement entitled Avrupa,
LLC Contribution Agreement (“Agreement”) that provided that, if
Schollmeier decided to withdraw from LLC, he would be repaid his
contribution.101 When Schollmeier requested repayment of his contribution,
and it was not forthcoming, he sued Demir and Tugend and alleged that they
breached their Agreement.102 On December 12, 2014, after hearing a motion
for summary judgment,103 the trial court held Demir personally liable on
Schollmeier’s breach of contract claim, and Demir appealed.104 The Third
District Court said that “[t]he final judgment against Demir individually as it
relates to Schollmeier’s financial contribution to Avrupa is based on the trial
court’s determination that the Agreement . . . was not a limited liability
company operating agreement, . . . but instead a personal contract solely
governing the terms of Schollmeier’s contribution.”105 The Third District
Court of Appeal disagreed and found that the agreement was tantamount to a
limited liability company operating agreement.106 The Third District
reversed and remanded,107 and cited to its decision in Dinuro Investments,
LLC v. Camacho,108 stated that a principal reason for forming a limited

100.
Demir v. Schollmeier, 199 So. 3d 442, 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
LLC was formed by Tulga Demir to run a Miami Beach night club. Id. The club was open
from early February of 2007 until March 29, 2007. Id. at 444.
101.
Id. at 443–44.
102.
Id. at 444. Schollmeier’s complaint contained counts that sought damages
for alleged “breach of fiduciary duty, . . . breach of statutory duty of loyalty and care” and a
count seeking an accounting, but there were proposals for settlement of these counts, and the
proposals were later accepted by Schollmeier. Demir, 199 So. 3d at 444.
103.
Id. Schollmeier stated that he asked for only $375,000 of the amount on
his motion for summary judgment because there was a dispute as to whether the other $25,000
was actually contributed. Id. at 444 n.2.
104.
Id. at 444.
105.
Id. at 445.
106.
Demir, 199 So. 3d at 445. Section 1 of the Agreement recited that it was
“a limited liability company agreement under and as provided in the Act.” Id. The definition
of Act in the Agreement was “the Limited Liability Company Act of the State of Florida.” Id.
at 444 n.1.
107.
Id. at 447.
108.
141 So. 3d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
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liability company is to obtain protection from personal liability.109
court, quoting from Dinuro Investments, LLC stated that:

13

The

Conspicuously missing from the operating agreement is any
provision stating that the members shall be directly liable to each
other for breaches of the terms of the operating agreement . . . .
Section 608.4227 of the Florida Statutes specifically provides that
members are typically shielded from individual liability for their
involvement with an LLC unless the terms of the articles of
110
organization or the operating agreement provide otherwise.

The court then quoted section 608.4227(1) of the 2011 Florida Statutes as
additional support.111 That subsection provided that:
Except as provided in this chapter, the members, managers, and
managing members of a limited liability company are not liable,
solely by reason of being a member or serving as a manager or
managing member, under a judgment, decree, or order of a court,
or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the
112
limited liability company.

The Avrupa agreement “[did] not contain any provision or language
indicating that any Member of Avrupa would be personally liable to any
109.
Demir, 199 So. 3d at 445 (citing Dinuro Invs., LLC, 141 So. 3d at 742).
110.
Id. at 446 (citing Dinuro Invs., LLC, 141 So. 3d at 742).
111.
Id. Section 608.4227 of the Florida Statutes was repealed effective June
11, 2015. Act Effective July 1, 2015, Ch. 2015-148, § 11, 2015 Fla. Laws 1, 9 (amending §
608.4227, FLA. STAT. 2011). Section 605.0304(1) of the Florida Revised Limited Liability
Company Act provides as follows:
A debt, obligation, or other liability of a limited liability
company is solely the debt, obligation, or other liability of
the company. A member or manager is not personally liable,
directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise,
for a debt, obligation, or other liability of the company solely
by reason of being or acting as a member or manager. This
subsection applies regardless of the dissolution of the
company.

Florida Revised Limited Liability Company Act, Ch. 2013-180, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 2105,
2142 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 605.0101–1108 (2013)). The Savings Clause provisions are
found in section 605.1106 of the Florida Statutes and its effective dates are under section
605.1108 of the Florida Statutes. Id. § 605.1106, 605.1108(4). A limited liability company
with the name Avrupa, LLC was “Admin Dissolution for Annual Report” on September 14,
2007.
Detail
by
Entity
Name:
Avrupa,
LLC,
SUNBIZ,
http://search.sunbiz.org/inquiry/corporationsearch/Byname (search in search bar for “Avrupa,
LLC”; then follow “Avrupa, LLC” hyperlink under “Entity Name List”) (last visited Dec. 31,
2017).
112.
Demir, 199 So. 3d at 446.
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other Member for the company’s obligations.”113 The court concluded that if
it was the parties’ intent that there would be personal liability for the parties’
capital contributions, “the terms needed to be explicit.”114 Mr. Schollmeier
could only look to the company for reimbursement.115
3.

Limited Partnerships and Corporations: Derivative Actions
Required

In this dispute among siblings, one brother (“Plaintiff”) sued three
brothers (“the Brothers”), over the siblings’ ownership interests in each of
the siblings’ several business entities including two closely held corporations
and two limited partnerships (“the Entities”).116 However, there was one
entity, Biloxi 3, LLC, involved in the litigation that was owned by the
Brothers, not Plaintiff.117 Plaintiff sought relief against the Brothers alleging
breach of fiduciary duty owed to him with respect to actions taken by the
Entities.118 The improper actions alleged were “unearned excessive bonuses
and management fees paid by” one of the Entities to the Brothers, and the
alleged improper diversion by the Brothers of the proceeds of a settlement
agreement away from one of the limited partnerships and to Biloxi 3, LLC.119
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, citing its decision in Dinuro
Investments, LLC.120 Plaintiff “failed to show a direct harm and a special
injury separate and distinct from that sustained by the other partners [and
shareholders]” so a derivative action would have been the proper
proceeding.121 The Third District Court of Appeal also affirmed the trial
court’s denial of the Plaintiff’s demand for arbitration under the partnership
and shareholder agreements.122
4.

Tortious Interference Claims: Statute of Limitation

On March 6, 2012, Mr. Eff (“Plaintiff”) brought an action against
Sony Pictures (“Defendant”) and alleged that Defendant tortuously interfered
in a business relationship that Plaintiff had with Mr. Silvera and another
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
See id.
116.
Fritz v. Fritz, 219 So. 3d 234, 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
117.
Id. at 236.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 236–39; see also Dinuro Invs., LLC v. Camacho, 141 So. 3d 731,
740 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
121.
Fritz, 219 So. 3d at 238.
122.
Id.
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person.123 Plaintiff alleged that he had a 25% interest in the movie Shottas
(“the Movie”) “pursuant to an oral agreement” made with Mr. Silvera and
another individual—who was not a party to the action—and that Plaintiff and
Mr. Silvera formed Access Pictures, LLC, to produce the Movie.124 He
further alleged that Defendant later made a licensing agreement with others
whereby Defendant acquired “exclusive distribution rights to Shottas” after
Mr. Silvera met with Defendant without Plaintiff.125 The trial court granted
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the applicable four-year
statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(o) of the Florida Statutes. 126
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.127 Under the licensing
agreement with other parties, the Defendant was to make the initial payment
on October 30, 2005 and other payments were alleged to have been made
later.128 In May of 2007, Plaintiff’s lawyer emailed Defendant to advise him
of Plaintiff’s interest in the Movie.129 The trial court ruled that October 30,
2005 was the date on which the Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference
accrued, and under the delayed discovery doctrine, May 2007 was therefore
the latest that Plaintiff found out about any alleged tortious interference.130
Thus, the lawsuit filed on March 6, 2012 was time barred under the four-year
statute of limitation unless the continuing tort doctrine applied to Plaintiff’s
claim.131 The Third District Court of Appeal described the continuing tort
doctrine as being “established by continual tortious acts, not by continual
harmful effects from an original, completed act.”132 The district court found
“no Florida cases addressing the continuing tort doctrine as it pertains to a
cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship.”133 The
district court refused to apply the doctrine to Plaintiff’s claim because “the
tort was not continual in nature merely because [Defendant] made
subsequent distribution payments. These additional distribution payments
were merely ‘harmful effects from an original, completed act.’”134

123.
Effs v. Sony Pictures Home Entm’t, Inc., 197 So. 3d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(o) (2016).
127.
Effs, 197 So. 3d at 1245.
128.
Id. at 1244.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
See id. at 1243–44.
132.
Effs, 197 So. 3d at 1245 (quoting Suarez v. City of Tampa, 987 So. 2d
681, 686 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
133.
Id.
134.
Id. (quoting Suarez, 987 So. 2d at 686).
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Sale of Business
1.

Discovery: Financial Information Provided to Accountant Not
Protected by Accountant-Client Privilege

In PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC v. Progressive Dental
Reconstruction, Inc.,135 PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC (“Purchaser”) sought
discovery of Progressive Dental Reconstruction’s (“Seller”) business and
financial records given by Seller to Seller’s accountant for income tax
purposes.136 Purchaser alleged that Seller acted fraudulently to accomplish
the sale and that the records were necessary to establish its claim.137 The trial
court denied the discovery request, and Purchaser sought immediate review
of the trial court’s ruling.138 The First District Court of Appeal granted the
petition for certiorari holding that the records were not shielded from the
discovery request by the accountant-client privilege.139 Seller did not
present any evidence that the records possessed by the accountant consisted
of privileged communications or work product.140 The First District Court of
Appeal held that otherwise discoverable records did not become privileged
just because they were sent to Seller’s accountant.141 The trial court order
was quashed and the case was remanded.142
2.

Valid Contract for Sale of Assets of Business Existed: No Unjust
Enrichment Remedy

“The parties were at one point good friends and business associates,”
said the Fourth District Court of Appeal before it explained the events
leading up to the litigation.143 Mr. Brancato and Mrs. Brancato (“Surviving
Spouse Seller”) sold the assets of a business144 to Valerie Fulton’s insurance
agency, Fulton Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Insurance Agency Purchaser”), and
Dean Fulton.145 Payment was to be based on commissions for the twelve135.
203 So. 3d 213 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
136.
Id. at 214.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC, 203 So. 3d at 214.
141.
Id. at 215.
142.
Id.
143.
Fulton v. Brancato, 189 So. 3d 967, 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
144.
Id. The appellate court did not indicate the capacity in which Surviving
Spouse Seller signed the sales agreement or if the agency was a separate entity. Id.
145.
Id. Surviving Spouse Seller sold the business when Mr. Brancato became
ill, but the date of his death is not stated in the appellate opinion. See id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/2

16

Landau: 2016-2017 Survey of Florida Cases Affecting Business Owners

2017]

2016-2017 SURVEY OF FLORIDA CASES

17

month period following the date of [the] [a]greement.146 When payments
were not made as expected, Surviving Spouse Seller sued Valerie Fulton and
Insurance Agency Purchaser alleging breach of contract.147 The jury found
that Insurance Agency Purchaser had breached the contract which was the
legal cause of the damage.148 However, the jury also found that Valerie
Fulton and Insurance Agency Purchaser were unjustly enriched by getting
the assets and not paying “the reasonable value of those assets,” and that they
had converted the assets.149 The jury awarded total damages of $98,000 to
Surviving Spouse Seller.150 On appeal, Valerie Fulton and Insurance Agency
Purchaser contested the unjust enrichment and conversion verdicts, as well as
Surviving Spouse Seller’s efforts to have the court pierce the corporate veil
in order to hold Valerie Fulton personally liable.151 The appellate court said
that a directed verdict should have been entered against Surviving Spouse
Seller on the unjust enrichment count.152 If an express contract exists, as
here, “an equitable theory, such as unjust enrichment or quantum meruit”
cannot be entertained.153 As to the conversion claim and damages, the
appellate court held that the damages were to be confined to the $98,000 jury
award for breach of contract, as “[t]here was no evidence that the seller
sustained any additional damages by the buyer and the buyers’ agency’s
conversion of other assets.”154

146.
Fulton, 189 So. 3d at 968.
147.
Id. at 969.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Fulton, 189 So. 3d at 969–70.
152.
Id. at 970.
153.
Id. at 969 (quoting Ocean Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bubeck, 956 So. 2d 1222,
1225 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
154.
Id. at 970. Does the such as limit the term equitable theory? Id. at 969.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Ocean Communications, Inc. v. Bubeck held that
restitution—which requires the existence of a contract—is available in cases where there has
been a breach of an express contract. Ocean Commc’ns, Inc., 956 So. 2d at 1225; see also
Barbara Landau, 2006–2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 32 NOVA L.
REV. 21, 58 (2007). “A court of equity has the power to reform” a contract in the case of
mutual mistake, scrivener’s error or inadvertence, and in cases of unilateral mistake of one
party combined with inequitable conduct by the other party. Goodall v. Whispering Woods
Ctr., 990 So. 2d 695, 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Barbara Landau, 2008–2009 Survey
of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 34 NOVA L. REV. 71, 97 (2009).
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Non-Compete Agreements
1.

Injunction: Where’s the Bond?

In the next case, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction on
March 29, 2012 in favor of Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Vital”) and against
two of Vital’s former employees (“Employees”)—in an action against
Employees and their new employer—Vital alleged breaches of non-compete
clauses and tortious interference.155 In May 2012, the circuit court dissolved
the injunction for reasons that are not stated in the court’s order.156
Employees then sought damages and attorneys’ fees in the same action.157
Damages were granted, Vital appealed the trial court’s order and was
successful on appeal.158 This case stands for the proposition that if a
temporary injunction is wrongfully issued, the persons wrongfully enjoined
may sue for damages in the amount of the bond under Rule 1.610(b) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; but if a bond is not posted, damages cannot
be collected, at least not pursuant to section 60.07 of the Florida Statutes.159
It seems that no bond was required when the preliminary injunction was
granted.160 Thus, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court’s award of damages to Vital.161 Of course, in the absence of the bond,
the injunction was not enforceable in the first place.162
2.

Breach During Term of Employment

Telemundo Media, LLC v. Mintz163 was an interesting non-compete
temporary injunction case.164 Joshua Mintz (“Mintz”) was employed by
Telemundo (“Telemundo”).165 The term of employment was from January 1,

155.
Vital Pharm., Inc. v. Prof’l Supplements, LLC, 210 So. 3d 766, 767 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2017); Order on Temporary Injunction at 1, Vital Pharm., Inc. v. Prof’l
Supplements, LLC, No. 12-7083 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2012).
156.
Order on Motion to Dissolve Temporary Injunction, Vital Pharm., Inc. v.
Prof’l Supplements, LLC, No. 12-7083 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2012).
157.
Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 767.
158.
Id.
159.
Id. at 767–69 (citing Hathcock v. Hathcock, 533 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1988)); see also FLA. STAT. § 60.07 (2016); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610 (b).
160.
See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610 (b); Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 767.
161.
Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 768–69.
162.
See id. at 767–68.
163.
194 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
164.
Id. at 435.
165.
Id.
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2015 through December 27, 2017.166 Mintz signed a non-compete agreement
with Telemundo barring certain employment for six months after Mintz’s
termination of employment with Telemundo.167 That part of the agreement
provided that Mintz agreed he would “not, either directly or indirectly,
provide services—as an employee or in any other status or capacity—to any
Spanish-language media competitor of Telemundo in the news,
entertainment, new media—e.g. the Internet, etc.—and telecommunications
industries, within the United States.”168 The employment agreement
contained an alternative dispute resolution provision in which Mintz agreed
to follow Telemundo’s dispute resolution process.169 Mintz advised
Telemundo that he was leaving to take a job in Mexico with a competitor of
Telemundo.170 Mintz planned to start work at his new job within two months
after he informed Telemundo that he was leaving.171 Telemundo sought
injunctive relief to prevent Mintz from starting his new employment before
the arbitration proceedings were complete.172 The trial court denied the
motion, concluding that Mintz could work in Mexico because the covenant
not to compete provision “only applied within the United States.”173 The
Third District Court of Appeal reversed, directing the trial court to enter an
order granting the temporary injunction.174 The appellate court reviewed the
elements necessary for a temporary injunction175 and concluded that all
elements necessary were present.176 The parties’ agreement provided that
services to be provided by Mintz “were ‘of a special, unique, unusual,
extraordinary, and intellectual character, giving them a peculiar value, the
loss of which the Company cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated
for in damages.’”177 It is apparent from the decision that the district court
166.
Id. Employer had an “irrevocable option to extend the term” for an
additional year. Id.
167.
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 435. The allegations in this case
were as follows: In November 2015, Mintz told Telemundo that Mintz planned to accept a
job with one of Telemundo’s major competitors, at which point, Telemundo set the
contractual alternative dispute resolution process in motion in late December. Id. Then, on
January 7, 2016, Mintz told Telemundo that he was planning to leave to start working for the
competitor on June 13, 2016. Id. This action was filed by Telemundo on January 11, 2016.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 435.
170.
Id.
171.
See id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 436.
175.
Id. at 435–36.
176.
Id. at 436.
177.
Id. at 435.
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concluded that the within the United States limitation did not apply to a
breach of Mintz’s obligation “to provide his unique personal services
exclusively to Telemundo for the contractually specified period,” as opposed
to after the termination of the employment contract.178
3.

Failure to Establish the Absence of Irreparable Harm

In 2015, Mr. Given (“Employee”), a regional sales manager in
Georgia, while working for Allied Universal Corporation, a Florida
corporation (“Former Employer”), signed a non-compete agreement “as a
Employee, who had been
condition of continued employment.”179
responsible for all of Former Employer’s sales territory north of Florida,
resigned from his position with Former Employer in March 2016, and
accepted a new position as a strategic account manager at a Georgia
company that directly competed with Former Employer.180
Former
Employer sought a temporary injunction to enforce the non-compete
agreement.181 The motion was denied and Former Employer appealed.182
The Third Circuit reversed, directing the trial court to grant the temporary
injunction requested.183
Former Employer presented evidence that
Employee’s new employment would cause Former Employer irreparable
harm in the absence of a temporary injunction.184 This “create[d] a
rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury” supporting the relief requested
under section 542.335(1)(j) of the Florida Statutes.185 Employee provided no
evidence that would establish the absence to the Former Employer of the
injury—contemplated by section 542.335(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes.186 In
178.
Id. at 435–36. The district court stated that “[t]his is notwithstanding the
language in the exclusivity provision that the trial court construed to mean that [Employee]
could provide his services to [Employer’s] competitor outside of the United States.”
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 436 n.1.
179.
Allied Universal Corp. v. Given, No. 3D16-1128, slip op. at 2 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2017). Employee was hired in 2010. Id.
180.
Id. The parties did not dispute the existence of a valid agreement not to
compete, Employee had become an employee of Univar, that the new employment happened
within one month after Employee resigned from his job with Former Employer, or that Univar
competed with Former Employer. See id. at 5 n.2. The agreement called for an eighteenmonth non-compete period within 150 miles of any operational facility of Former Employer.
Id. at 2.
181.
Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 3.
182.
Id. at 1.
183.
Id. at 8.
184.
Id. at 7.
185.
Id. at 6 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(j) (2016)).
186.
Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 6 (discussing FLA. STAT. §
542.335(1)(b)).
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fact, Employee admitted that absent an injunction “he would begin managing
a sales territory” for his new employer.187 The Third District Court of
Appeal reminded us that it is not necessary that Former Employer actually
prove irreparable harm before injunctive relief may properly be granted;
quoting the Supreme Court of Florida in Capraro v. Lanier Business
Products, Inc.,188 that “[i]t truly can be said in this type of litigation that
relief delayed is relief denied.”189
III.
A.

ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST THIRD PARTIES

Tax Cases

The constitutional challenge presented in Florida Department of
Revenue v. DIRECTV, Inc.190 arose out of the imposition of a sales tax by the
State of Florida on satellite TV services at 10.8% while cable TV services
were taxed at 6.8%.191 DIRECTV, Inc. and Echostar, LLC (“Satellite
Companies”) sued the Florida Department of Revenue (“DOR”), the Florida
Cable Telecommunications Association (“FCTA”), and others alleging that
the Communications Services Tax (“CST”)192 is unconstitutional under the
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.193 The relief sought, in addition to a
declaratory judgment as to the unconstitutionality of the tax, was a
permanent injunction and a refund of the tax.194 The trial court agreed with
the DOR, thus denying the tax refund and injunctive relief, but the First
District Court of Appeal reversed, finding an as applied violation of the
Commerce Clause; that is, the tax was found to be discriminatory in effect,
although not in purpose.195 In so doing, the district court found that cable
companies and Satellite Companies “were similarly situated because they
both ‘operate in the same market and are direct competitors within that

187.
188.
189.

Id.
466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).
Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 7–8 (quoting Capraro, 466 So. 2 at

213).
190.
215 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 2017). As of the date of submission of this Article,
a petition for certiorari is pending before the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28
U.S.C. § 2101(c) (2012).
191.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49; see also FLA. STAT. § 202.12(1) (2006).
This discrepancy began with the enactment of the Communications Services Tax. DIRECTV,
Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49. That statute currently imposes a tax of 9.07% on satellite service, while
cable service is taxed under that statute at a rate of 4.92%. FLA. STAT. § 202.12(1) (2015).
192.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49; see also FLA. STAT. § 202.12.
193.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49.
194.
Id.
195.
Id. at 49–50.
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market.’”196 The district court also concluded that cable companies are instate interests because of the extent of “their local infrastructure and local
employment.”197 The First District Court of Appeal then held that “because
the CST favors communications that use local infrastructure, it has a
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.”198 The DOR and the FCTA
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that the
Dormant Commerce Clause had not been violated.199
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants to the
United States Congress the authority “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several [s]tates.”200 In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has
long recognized that even on matters with respect to which the United States
Congress has not legislated, certain state taxation may be barred by the
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.201 Under the test set forth in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady202 (“Complete Auto test”), a state tax will not offend
the Commerce Clause provided the tax “[(1)] is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [(2)] is fairly apportioned, [(3)] does
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [(4)] is fairly related to the
services provided by the State.”203 Satellite Companies relied on the third
requirement and claimed that the tax had a discriminatory effect benefiting
in-state commerce versus out-of-state interests.204
The Supreme Court of Florida said that “[s]tatutes that openly
discriminate against out-of-state economic interests in order to protect instate interests are subject to a per se rule of invalidity.”205 However, before
discrimination against interstate commerce may be found, entities subject to
disparate tax treatment must be determined to be similarly situated.206 The
DOR took the position that satellite and cable companies are not similarly
situated, but the Supreme Court of Florida did not agree.207 The Court, after
noting that “[w]hat is required for entities to be considered substantially
similar has not been extensively considered by the courts,” stated that “[i]t
196.
Id. at 49.
197.
Id.
198.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49.
199.
Id. at 50, 55.
200.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
201.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d. at 50 (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)).
202.
430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
203.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 50 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc.,
430 U.S. at 279).
204.
Id. at 51.
205.
Id. (quoting Simmons v. State, 944 So. 2d 317, 330 (Fla. 2006)).
206.
Id.
207.
Id. at 51–52.
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appears that, at the very least, the entities must be in competition with one
another.”208 The Court concluded that cable TV and satellite TV were
substantially similar businesses competing for the same customers.209 The
Court then discussed whether cable companies were in-state entities, as
argued by Satellite Companies.210 The Court found that both were out-ofstate businesses, holding that “[c]able is not a local, in-state interest any
more than satellite.”211
Because both are out-of-state for Dormant
Commerce Clause purposes, the Court said that Satellite Companies’
argument of discriminatory effect could not succeed.212 As to the
discriminatory purpose argument made by Satellite Companies, the Court
concluded that, notwithstanding the difference in tax rates, the applicable
statute was not enacted for a discriminatory purpose and there was no intent
to favor cable TV.213
In the context of its discussion on whether cable companies are instate, the Court noted that “every state and federal court considering [satellite
companies’ Dormant] Commerce Clause challenges brought by the satellite
industry . . . has held that these [tax measures that favor cable] do not violate
the Dormant Commerce Clause.”214 The Court noted that some cases have
done so on the grounds that satellite and cable are not similarly situated,215
while others have found that “cable is not an in-state interest.”216 The Court
said it agreed with the latter group of decisions.217
Florida Department of Revenue v. American Business USA Corp.218
also involved a challenge based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, but in
this case, the taxpayer, American Business USA Corp. (“Internet
Corporation”), operated its business from Wellington, Florida.219 Internet
Corporation was engaged in the online internet business of selling “flowers,
gift baskets, and other items of tangible personal property.”220 Internet
Corporation did not keep an inventory of goods for sale, but would instead
use florists that were located near the place to which the order was to be
208.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 51 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy,
Tax Comm’r of Ohio, 519 U.S. 278, 298–99 (1997)).
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 52–53.
211.
Id. at 53.
212.
Id.
213.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 54–55.
214.
Id. at 53.
215.
Id. at 53 n.1.
216.
Id. at 53–54, 54 n.2.
217.
Id. at 54.
218.
191 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1067 (2017).
219.
Id. at 909 & n.1.
220.
Id. at 909 n.1.
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delivered.221 Internet Corporation charged sales tax when flowers and other
items were to be delivered to Florida customers.222 Internet Corporation did
not charge sales tax on items delivered to customers in other states.223
The statute that was challenged by Internet Corporation, section
212.05(1)(l) of the Florida Statutes provides, in part, that “[f]lorists located
in this state are liable for sales tax on sales to retail customers regardless of
where or by whom the items are to be delivered.”224 Internet Corporation
contested the DOR’s ruling that Internet Corporation was liable under this
statute for tax on sales to non-Florida customers.225 The DOR’s ruling
provided that “the tax required by [the statute was] a tax on the privilege of
engaging in business in Florida and is not a tax on the property sold.”226 On
appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Internet Corporation alleged
that the imposition of the tax with respect to Internet Corporation’s sales to
out-of-state customers was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and in violation of
the Dormant Commerce Clause.227 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
ruled that taxing internet “sales to out-of-state customers . . . violate[d] the
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.”228 The DOR appealed to the Supreme Court
of Florida, and the Court quashed the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s
decision.229 The Supreme Court of Florida applied the Complete Auto test to
determine if the imposition of the tax violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause.230 After a lengthy examination of the facts of the case, the Court
determined that the tax passed muster—satisfying the four prongs of the
Complete Auto test—and thus, the tax did not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause.231
The Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that if Internet
Corporation did not have any physical presence in Florida, the imposition of
the tax on sales to out-of-state customers would have clearly violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause.232 But, based on Internet Corporation’s
presence in Florida, with its headquarters being located in Wellington,
Florida, and Internet Corporation “doing business in Florida since 2001 . . .
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id. at 909 & n.1.
Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 909 n.1.
Id. at 908; see also FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(l) (2012).
Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 909.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 908.
Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 912.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 914.
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accept[ing] internet orders” from that location, the Court found that the
substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto test was satisfied.233 Those
facts also served to defeat Internet Corporation’s due process argument of
lack of minimum contacts.234
In the next case, the First District Court of Appeal certified the
following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter “of great
public importance: Does the ‘Local Option Tourist Development Act,’
Codified at Section 125.0104, [of the] Florida Statutes, impose a tax on the
total amount . . . received by an . . . on-line travel company’s website, or only
on the amount the property owner re[covers] for the rental of the
accommodations?”235
The Supreme Court of Florida rephrased the question as follows:
“Are the total monetary amounts that [online travel companies] charge their
customers to secure reservations for transient accommodation rentals in
Florida . . . subject to taxation under section 125.0104 [of the] Florida
Statutes?”236
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the negative,
holding that the tax can only be imposed on the amount paid to the transient
lessor—the hotel, motel, or other provider of accommodations—and not on
the total amount paid to the online travel company, that difference being
referred to as the mark-up.237 Justices Labarga and Quince concurred with
233.
Id.
234.
Id. at 914, 917. The Court, discussing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, stated
that “[d]ue process requires only that there be some minimal connection between the state and
the transaction it seeks to tax.” Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 917; Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1992). The Florida Supreme Court, relying on Quill Corp.
and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue stated the following with respect to
the alleged due process violation: “We have concluded that American Business’[] activities
have a substantial nexus to Florida. Thus, the minimum connection required to satisfy due
process is also met.” Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 917; Quill Corp, 504 U.S. at 307;
Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967), abrogated by Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Of course, the converse is not necessarily the
case, as the district court pointed out, again, citing Quill Corp. for the proposition that a
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause may exist even where there is no due process
violation. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 910.
235.
Alachua Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d 730, 731 (Fla. 2015) (quoting
Alachua Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 110 So. 3d 941, 951–52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g
denied, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2030 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015)).
236.
Id. at 733; see also Broward Cty. v. Orbitz, LLC, 135 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam), review denied, 192 So. 3d 35 (Fla. 2015) (unpublished table
decision); Leon Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 128 So. 3d 81, 82 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (mem.)
(per curiam), review denied, 192 So. 3d 39 (Fla. 2015) (unpublished table decision).
237.
Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 732, 737. The mark-up was said to be
“between [25%] and [45%].” Id. at 738–39. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District,
Third Division, in City of Chicago v. Expedia, had before it a controversy regarding the
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the opinion of Justice Perry, Justice Pariente concurred in the result and
wrote a separate opinion, and Justice Canady concurred in the result; while
Justice Lewis dissented with the opinion with Justice Polston concurring in
the dissent.238
The next two cases are district court decisions involving sales
taxes.239 In the first, an agreement was reached during the DOR’s sales tax
audit of Verizon Business Purchasing, LLC (“LLC”), by which the parties
agreed to extend the statute of limitations on the tax assessment until March
31, 2011.240 On February 8, 2011, the DOR sent LLC a Notice of Proposed
Assessment (“NOPA”) for more than $3 million plus interest.241 The DOR
advised LLC that an informal protest could be filed by April 11, 2011,
administrative review could be sought, or judicial proceedings could be
instituted by LLC, but if LLC did not file a protest, the assessment would
become final on April 11, 2011.242 LLC was also informed that in the
absence of an informal protest, “‘an administrative hearing or judicial
proceeding, . . . [had to be brought] no later than [June 8, 2011] or [sixty]
days from the date the assessment’” became final.243 LLC was also advised
that if a protest was not filed, “the proposed assessment [would] become a

Chicago Hotel Accommodations Tax (“CHAT”), under Chicago Municipal Code § 3-24-010
(1990). City of Chi. v. Expedia, Inc., No. 1-15-3402, 2017 WL 1511961, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct.
Apr. 26), withdrawn, May 16, 2017. The court in Illinois stated that “[w]ell after the CHAT
ordinance was enacted, the Internet was invented and, eventually, profitable [online travel
companies] began operating. The [City of Chicago] has joined numerous taxing authorities
who have attempted to apply established tax provisions to [online travel companies’] online
business model.” Id. at *2. The court went to explain that the results from cases in other
jurisdictions may be of limited assistance because of differences in statutory language. Id.
For example, in Orbitz, LLC v. Indiana Department of State Revenue, the Tax Court of
Indiana declined to “rely on [out of state decisions] or find them persuasive” because of statespecific statutory language upon which the case’s resolution was dependent. Orbitz, LLC v.
Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 66 N.E. 3d 1012, 1015–16 n.4 (Ind. T.C. 2016). Just a word of
caution—as true today in the age of immediate and magic cite checking as it was in the days
of only paper books and supplements: Orbitz, LLC did not expressly cite Alachua County,
although the parties’ briefs may have, but a cite check of Alachua County disclosed that
Orbitz, LLC declined to follow the Florida Supreme Court’s Alachua County decision. Id. at
1015 n.4; see also Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737. But did it? Compare Orbitz, LLC, 66
N.E. 3d at 1018 with Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737.
238.
Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737.
239.
See Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 191 So.
3d 516, 517 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC16-967 2016 WL 5407681
(Fla. 2016); Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC v. State, 164 So. 3d 806, 807–08 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2015).
240.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 807–08.
241.
Id. at 808.
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
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FINAL ASSESSMENT on [April 11, 2011].”244 LLC filed suit against the
DOR challenging the NOPA on statute of limitations grounds, asserting that
the DOR had been required to make an assessment before March 31, 2011.245
The DOR successfully moved for summary judgment and LLC appealed.246
The district court concluded that the DOR’s assessment of the tax was barred
by the statute of limitations on assessment.247 The statute of limitations
contained in section 95.091(3)(a)1.b. of the Florida Statutes requires that any
tax due under section 72.011 of the Florida Statutes must be “determine[d]
and assess[ed] . . . within [three] years after the date the tax is due, any return
with respect to tax is due, or such return is filed, whichever occurs later.”248
Thus, the question presented was whether the DOR’s assessment was
timely.249 As noted above, the DOR had, by agreement, until March 31,
2011, to assess the tax.250 The NOPA was issued on February 8, 2011.251
The DOR argued that the date the NOPA was issued, February 8, 2011, was
the date it assessed the tax against LLC.252 Thus, according to the DOR, the
assessment was timely.253 It was conceded by “the parties [that] section
95.091 does not define the [term] assess.”254 LLC pointed out that under
section 213.21(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations on
assessments is tolled when informal protests are filed.255 LLC argued, in
effect, and the district court agreed, that there would be no purpose for that
tolling provision if the NOPA was the assessment, as the assessment would
have been made.256 The First District Court of Appeal agreed “that the
assessment contemplated in [section 95.091(3)(a)] is a final assessment.”257
As the district court pointed out, since there is a sixty-day period between the
NOPA and the date the NOPA becomes final, if the taxpayer does not file a
protest, all the DOR would have had to do in this case was to issue the
NOPA at least “sixty days prior to . . . March 31, 2011.”258 In answering the
244.
Id. (alteration in original).
245.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 808.
246.
Id. at 808–09.
247.
Id. at 812–13.
248.
Id. at 809; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a)1.b (2010).
249.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 809.
250.
Id. at 808.
251.
Id.
252.
Id.
253.
Id. at 809–10.
254.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 809; see also FLA. STAT. §
95.091 (2010).
255.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 808; see also FLA. STAT. §
213.21(1)(b) (2010).
256.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 811–12.
257.
Id. at 811; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a).
258.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 812.
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question presented, that is, whether NOPA was the assessment contemplated
by section 95.091(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, or whether the date the
NOPA became final was the assessment, the district court, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, concluded that the pertinent statute of limitations
referred to a final assessment and the NOPA was not a final assessment.259
American Heritage Window Fashions, LLC v. Department of
Revenue260 involved an assessment of sales tax and interest against American
Heritage Window Fashions, LLC (“LLC”) for more than $220,000.261 On
March 29, 2010, the DOR served a NOPA on LLC, and pursuant to section
72.011(1)(a) and (2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, informed LLC of its options
to contest the assessment.262 LLC did not avail itself of any of the options.263
Collection efforts by the DOR began at the end of 2010, and on April 1,
2013, almost three years after the relevant periods stated in the NOPA
expired, the DOR obtained $7,507.58 from an account that the DOR had
ordered frozen back on May 10, 2011, “of which $6,525.95 was applied to
the . . . deficiency, roughly [3%] of the assessed sum.”264 On July 10, 2013,
LLC requested a refund of the amount applied to the deficiency, alleging
“that it was an audit overpayment.”265 The DOR declined “the request on
August 26, 2013, and [LLC] filed a written protest on September 25, 2013 . .
. [seeking] ‘to appeal the Notice of Proposed Assessment’” based on its
argument regarding the underlying liability.266 The DOR denied the protest
on the merits which “made final the [DOR’s] denial of [the LLC’s] refund
application.”267 LLC sought further administrative review, and eventually
the matter found its way to the Second District Court of Appeal.268 The
district court affirmed the DOR’s determination that LLC’s challenge was
untimely.269 To bring what amounted to an untimely action to contest a tax
assessment through a petition to review a refund denial under circumstances,
like those presented in this case, would, said the court, “render the statute’s
sixty-day limitation on actions brought to contest tax assessments

259.
Id. at 811–12; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a).
260.
191 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC16967 2016 WL 5407681 (Fla. 2016).
261.
Id. at 517.
262.
Id. at 517–18; see also FLA STAT. § 72.011(1)(a), (2)(a) (2010).
263.
Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC, 191 So. 3d at 518.
264.
Id.
265.
Id.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC, 191 So. 3d at 518.
269.
Id. at 524.
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meaningless.”270 Section 72.011(5) of the Florida Statutes “is the language
of a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim.”271
ValleyCrest Landscape Maintenance, Inc. (“ValleyCrest”) sued the
DOR for a refund of motor fuel tax paid.272 ValleyCrest, which is in the
business of residential and commercial landscaping, uses lawn equipment
that runs on diesel fuel and gas, both purchased by ValleyCrest at retail fuel
stations.273 ValleyCrest argued that the second gas tax authorized under the
Article XII, section 9(c) of the Florida Constitution applies only to motor
vehicles, and the tax under section 206.41(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes
applies only to vehicles operated on public roads and not “to off-road uses of
gasoline.”274 ValleyCrest also argued that not giving it an exemption, and
hence a refund of the taxes, amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection
Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions.275 The trial court
ruled in favor of the DOR, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.276
Section 206.41(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes exempts from the motor fuel tax
on gasoline anyone “‘who uses any motor fuel for agricultural, aquacultural,
commercial fishing, or commercial aviation purposes,’” provided that the
fuel is not “‘used in any vehicle or equipment driven or operated on public
highways of [Florida],’” and provided that a refund is requested.277
ValleyCrest was being taxed on fuel it used operating its off-road
equipment.278 The district court of appeal first noted that “there is no usebased exemption for landscaping equipment” as there is for the other
enumerated uses.279 The legislature has broad power to create distinctions
and classifications in tax statutes.280 These distinctions can be upheld
without violating the Equal Protection Clause so long as there are nonarbitrary reasons for so doing.281 As an example, in this case, the district
court also noted that the landscaping business did not have the same

270.
Id. at 521.
271.
Id. at 522 (citing Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So.
2d 814, 815 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam)); see also FLA. STAT. § 72.011(5) (2010).
272.
See ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc. v. State, 213 So. 3d 992, 994 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 12079 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App.
2016), and review denied, 2017 WL 192041 (Fla. 2017).
273.
Id.
274.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 206.41(1)(a) (2016).
275.
ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc., 213 So. 3d at 994.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 206.41(4)(c)1.
278.
See ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc., 213 So. 3d at 994.
279.
Id. at 994–95.
280.
Id. at 995.
281.
See id.
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economic impact on the state as did the agricultural, commercial fishing, and
aviation industries.282
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC (“LLC”) challenged its 2008 ad
valorem tax assessment by filing suit in the circuit court in 2009 against
Hillsborough County.283 LLC paid the “2008 taxes in an amount . . .
admitted in good faith was due and owing” pursuant to section 194.171(3) of
the Florida Statutes.284 LLC did not timely pay the 2009 real estate tax, but it
did timely pay real estate taxes assessed after 2009.285 The property
appraiser successfully moved to have LLC’s 2009 complaint dismissed based
on section 194.171(5) of the Florida Statutes because the 2009 tax was not
timely paid.286 LLC appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s decision.287 The statute requires only that all taxes
assessed for years after the year the taxpayer’s action is brought be timely
paid, not that taxes for the year in which the taxpayer’s action is brought be
timely paid.288
B.
Contracts for the Sale of Real Estate, Deeds, and Landlord-Tenant
Cases
1.

Real Estate Contract: Specific Performance Denied

Real estate developer (“Seller”) entered into an agreement with
Appellees (“Purchaser”) for the sale and purchase of property “adjacent to
the Mardi Gras, a Daytona Beach business”289 having “a minimum of [fifty]
frontage feet on the Boardwalk and [also having] ‘sufficient land to build a

282.
Id. at 995–96.
283.
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC v. Henriquez, 194 So. 3d 1091, 1091–
92 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
284.
Id. at 1092; see also FLA. STAT. § 194.171(3) (2009).
285.
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 1092.
286.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 194.171(5).
287.
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 1092.
288.
Id. at 1093.
289.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC v. Paspalakis, 220 So. 3d 457, 459 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied, 212 So. 3d 1063 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2017), review
denied, No. SC17-568, 2017 WL 2438408 (Fla. 2017). This was a “public-private economic
development project,” but the events here apparently predated the amendment of Article X §
6(a) of Florida’s Constitution in 2007. FLA. CONST. art X § 6; Boardwalk at Daytona Dev.
LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459 n.1; see also Eileen Zaffiro-Kean, Daytona Boardwalk Property Fight
Continues, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J. (Nov. 26, 2016, 2:57 PM), http://www.newsjournalonline.com/news/20161126/daytona-boardwalk-property-fight-continues. There are no
dates set forth in the district court’s opinion with respect to the transactions or the proceedings
in the trial court. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459; Zaffiro-Kean, supra.
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7500 square foot, one story building.’”290 As it turned out, three parcels of
real estate potentially fit this description.291 Seller requested declaratory
relief that a parcel of real estate that it tendered to the Purchaser was in
conformance with the parties’ agreement, while Purchaser filed a
counterclaim seeking an order requiring the transfer to Purchaser by Seller of
a different parcel.292 The trial court ordered specific performance as to one
of these parcels and Seller appealed.293 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that it was error to order specific performance in this case
because “[s]pecific performance is only available to compel the transfer of
land that is specifically described in the parties’ agreement alone or where its
identity is clear from an agreement that is appropriately supplemented by
parol evidence,”294 which was not something that could be satisfied on this
record.295 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order of specific
performance and Purchaser filed a motion for rehearing.296 On motion for
rehearing, which was denied, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded
that Purchaser had chosen to pursue one remedy in its litigation, that is,
specific performance.297 The Fifth District Court of Appeal said that
Purchasers “freely made their choice . . . to not pursue different causes of
action or other remedies, such as money damages, reformation, or
rescission.”298
2.

Arbitration Requirement Contained in Real Estate Contract Not
Waived

The contract for sale to Appellees (“Purchasers”) of an outparcel of
Timber Pine’s (“Seller”) shopping mall contained a binding arbitration
clause, and the amended deed restrictions contained restrictions that gave
Seller certain approval rights over construction on the property it sold to

290.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459.
291.
Id. at 459.
292.
Id. at 460. There was a claim for damages exceeding $15,000 contained
in Purchaser’s amended counterclaim, but the appellate court noted that such damages were
not mentioned again in the counterclaim. Id. at 460 n.2. Purchaser’s claim for money
damages becomes the subject of the appellate court’s comments on denial by the court of
Purchaser’s motion for rehearing on the appeal. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC v.
Paspalakis, 212 So. 3d 1063, 1063–64 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
293.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 460.
294.
Id. at 459.
295.
Id.
296.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 212 So. 3d at 1063; Boardwalk at
Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459.
297.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 212 So. 3d at 1063–64.
298.
Id. at 1064.
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Purchasers.299 Purchasers consented in writing to these amendments.300
After the closing, Seller sued Purchasers seeking injunctive relief and
damages based on Purchasers’ alleged violation of Seller’s construction
approval rights.301 The injunction was denied, and the Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial.302 Purchasers meanwhile answered
the complaint and counterclaimed alleging Seller breached the contract by
failing to provide input on the plans for Purchasers’ building and failure to
provide a cross-parking easement.303 Seller moved to compel arbitration of
Purchasers’ counterclaim.304 The trial judge denied the motion without
explanation; the Seller appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded with instructions.305 The right to arbitration can be
waived, and such waiver may be deemed to have occurred if the party
demanding arbitration has resorted to the courts to enforce its claims
otherwise subject to arbitration.306 However, here, there was no significant
relationship between Seller’s rights under the amended deed restrictions and
the arbitration clause in the antecedent contract.307 Therefore, Seller’s suit
against Purchasers did not constitute a waiver of arbitration under the
contract with respect to Purchasers’ counterclaim alleging breach of
contract.308 “[T]he mere coincidence that the parties in dispute have a
contractual relationship will ordinarily not be enough to mandate arbitration
of the dispute.”309
3.

No Merger in Deed

The next case provides a discussion of an exception to the general
rule that “preliminary agreements concerning the sale of [real] property
merge into the deed executed pursuant to the sale.”310 Mr. Harkless, in 2008,
299.
Timber Pines Plaza, LLC v. Zabrzyski, 211 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
300.
Id.
301.
Id.
302.
Id. (citing Timber Pines Plaza, LLC v. Zabrzyski, No. 5D16-95, 2016 WL
7405671, at *1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished table
decision)).
303.
Id.
304.
Timber Pines Plaza, LLC, 211 So. 3d at 1149.
305.
Id. at 1150–51.
306.
See id.
307.
Id. at 1151.
308.
Id.
309.
Timber Pines Plaza, LLC, 211 So. 3d. at 1150 (alteration in original)
(quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999)).
310.
Harkless v. Laubhan, 219 So. 3d 900, 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016),
reh’g denied (Jan. 30, 2017).
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leased part of his real estate to Verizon Wireless and granted it an easement
for the construction of a cell tower, but the construction did not begin until
May 2012.311 In the interim, the property on which the tower was to be
located, and with respect to which the easement was granted, was transferred
twice.312 The first transfer occurred in April 2011 when Mr. Harkless sold to
Mr. and Mrs. Lolly ten acres of his property—including the land leased to
Verizon Wireless and subject to the easement.313 There was an addendum
(“the Addendum”) to the Harkless-Lolly contract that stated, in part, that Mr.
Harkless would continue to own the “easement and Verizon cell tower
lease.”314 No mention was made in the warranty deed to the Lollys from Mr.
Harkless of any right on the part of Mr. Harkless to receive lease payments
from Verizon.315 The Lollys, just three months after the transfer to them,
sold the real estate to Mr. and Mrs. Laubhan.316 The language in the
contract, between the Lollys and the Laubhans, differed from the language in
the Addendum to the Harkless-Lolly contract.317 The Lolly-Laubhan
contract stated, in part, that “[b]uyer is aware of Verizon tower lease and has
received a copy of the survey and lease.”318 By warranty deed in July 2011,
the Lollys transferred the property to the Laubhans—the deed making no
mention of any right of Mr. Harkless to receive lease payments from
Verizon.319 But that was not all that happened in the interim, as Mr.
Harkless, sometime prior to May 2012, gave a third party, Communications
Capital Group, LLC, an “option to purchase his interest in the Lease for
$175,000.”320 Communications Capital Group, LLC then sought signed and
notarized confirmation from the Laubhans that they acknowledged Mr.
Harkless’ rights to continue to receive rent from Verizon Wireless pursuant
to the lease.321 Because the requested response was not forthcoming and the
response instead was that “they owned the Parcel free and clear of Mr.
Harkless’ right to receive rent,” the option was not exercised.322 At this
point, Mr. Harkless sought declaratory relief regarding his right to the rent,

311.
Id. at 902.
312.
Id. at 902–03.
313.
Id.
314.
Id. at 903.
315.
Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 903.
316.
Id.
317.
Id.
318.
Id.
319.
Id. Both deeds did, however, make mention of an easement. Harkless,
219 So. 3d at 903–04.
320.
Id. at 903.
321.
Id.
322.
Id.
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plus reformation of both deeds reflecting his rights under the Verizon
Wireless lease.323
The Laubhans filed a motion for summary judgment, relying on the
deeds and another agreement mentioned in both deeds, and argued that there
was no ambiguity that would permit the consideration of parol evidence.324
They also claimed that they were not aware, prior to the litigation, that there
was a Harkless-Lolly agreement that Mr. Harkless retained his right to the
rent.325 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Laubhans,
and Mr. Harkless appealed.326 The appellate court decided that because the
Lollys and Mr. Harkless, being all the parties to the agreement that reserved
the rent to Mr. Harkless, agreed that the Addendum language “was intended
to reserve Mr. Harkless’s right to” the lease payments, that the right did not
merge into the deed to the Lollys “as a matter of law.”327 Mr. Harkless
effectively reserved his right to receive rent, that is, his contract with the
Lollys and the reservation of the right to the rent did not merge into the
deed.328 The district court concluded that summary judgment should not
have been granted because the question remaining on remand as to whether
the Laubhans were bona fide purchasers for value, created a “genuine issue
of material fact.”329 At this point, the Second District Court of Appeal
addressed the issue of whether the Laubhans could be bona fide purchasers
under Florida’s recording statute, section 695.01(1) of the Florida Statutes.330
The court, after noting that the parties had not identified any cases addressing
whether the recording statute applies to the right to receive rent and the court
had found none, held that the plain language of the statute provides that “[n]o
conveyance . . . of real property, or of any interest therein” shall be valid
against bona fide purchasers unless properly recorded.331 The Second
District Court of Appeal concluded that the right to receive rent is covered

323.
Id.
324.
Harkless, 219 So. 3d. at 903–04. The other agreement that was referred to
in both deeds was “the Amended Memorandum of Lease Agreement” which the district court
described as “essentially an abridged version of the Lease” that did not mention any right
retained by Mr. Harkless to receive payments under the Verizon Wireless lease. Id. at 903.
The district court declined to accept any line of decision out of other district courts, citing
cases from the Third District and the Fourth District, that the words subject to in a deed could
result in the deed being rendered generally ambiguous. Id. at 906.
325.
Id. at 903.
326.
Id. at 902, 904.
327.
Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 905.
328.
Id. at 909.
329.
Id. at 902, 909.
330.
Id. at 908–09; see also FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1) (2011).
331.
FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1); Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 908.
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by the statute and remanded for a determination of the Laubhans status as
bona fide purchasers.332
4.

Denial of Temporary Injunction in Suit Based on Deed Restrictions

Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. (“Planned Parenthood”)
bought real property subject to deed restrictions.333 MMB Properties
(“MMB”), a general partnership that runs a cardiology practice in the same
medical complex, is subject to the same deed restrictions.334 Planned
Parenthood intended to offer abortion services at the facility, and MMB—
claiming that performance of such services violated the deed restriction—
sought and obtained from the circuit court a temporary injunction that
enjoined Planned Parenthood from performing abortions at the facility.335
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the temporary
injunction, finding that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial
and competent evidence.336 The district court also found that in order to have
the temporary injunction dissolved, as had been sought by Planned
Parenthood, it “needed to establish changed circumstances which it did not
do.”337 The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the Fifth District Court of
Appeal’s affirmance of the temporary injunction and remanded the case to
the trial court for a hearing on a permanent injunction.338 The Court claimed
conflict jurisdiction involving the standard for modifying or dissolving a
temporary injunction; the Court noting that the First, Second, Third, and
Fifth Districts all require changed circumstances, while the Fourth District
does not.339 The Court adopted the position of the Fourth District, noting
that the purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo
pending final injunctive proceedings.340 The principle has developed that a
party seeking to modify or dissolve a temporary injunction must show
changed conditions or changed circumstances to justify modification or
dissolution of the injunction.341 However, there is no such requirement in
Rule 1.610(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.342 The Court
332.
Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 908–09.
333.
Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d
918, 920 (Fla. 2017).
334.
See id.
335.
Id. at 920–22.
336.
Id. at 923–24.
337.
Id. at 923.
338.
Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc., 211 So. 3d at 929.
339.
Id. at 924–25.
340.
Id. at 924–26.
341.
Id. at 924.
342.
Id.; see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610(d).
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concluded that it was within the trial court’s discretion “to reconsider, on a
motion to dissolve, a temporary injunction entered after notice and a hearing,
. . . regardless of whether the arguments or evidence could have been brought
to the attention of the court at the hearing on the injunction.”343 In other
words, the changed circumstances rule in this context is no more.344 The
Court went beyond the conflict jurisdiction issue and found that the trial
court’s decision, granting the temporary injunction and declining to dissolve
it, was not supported by competent substantial evidence—particularly with
respect to the likelihood of MMB succeeding on the merits.345
5.

Self-Help Provision in Lease Invalid

The lease between (“Landlord”) and (“Tenant”) gave Landlord
certain self-help authority if an Event of Default occurred, including the
authority “after the continued Tenant default after the expiration of the time
to cure” and “without further written notice to Tenant . . . enter upon and
take possession of the Leased Premises and expel or remove Tenant and any
other occupant therefrom with or without having terminated the lease.”346
The agreement further provided that [l]andlord shall not be deemed to have
violated any right of Tenant and shall not be deemed to be guilty of trespass,
conversion or any other criminal or civil action as a result of such action.” 347
The day came when Landlord found it necessary to lock Tenant out of much
of the leased premises and obtain police help in escorting Tenant’s
employees off the premises.348
343.
Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc., 211 So. 3d at 925.
344.
Id. at 926.
345.
See id. at 928. Justice Canady, joined by Justice Polston, dissented. Id. at
929 (Canady, J., dissenting).
346.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship v. Nantucket Enters.,
211 So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC17-491, 2017 WL
2774368 (Fla. 2017).
347.
Id. The appellate court did not discuss the introductory provision of the
language quoted in the text above. See id. The provision began as follows: “[I]f and
whenever any Event of Default by Tenant shall occur, Landlord may after the continued
Tenant default after the expiration of the time to cure . . . at its option and without further
written notice to Tenant.” Id. Presumably, the language was deemed not crucial to the court’s
conclusion. See id.
348.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44. The
leased premises included a restaurant and office space. Id. The restaurant was closed by the
City of Palm Beach Gardens based on Tenant not obtaining the right permits. Id. The city
posted “red tags on the doors, which indicated the restaurant was unsafe for occupancy.” Id.
“The same day, Landlord [installed] chains and locks on the . . . kitchen [doors], the
restaurant,” and the office doors. Id. Several days later, the lease was terminated by
Landlord, and the Landlord “had the police escort Tenant’s employees from the restaurant.”
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44. It is not clear from the
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Each party filed claims against the other.349 Landlord alleged that
Tenant breached the terms of the lease, and Tenant alleged conversion in
addition to wrongful eviction.350 A directed verdict on the claim of wrongful
eviction was entered by the court against Landlord on Tenant’s motion, and
the jury awarded $8.8 million in damages against Landlord plus found
liability as to the conversion claim and awarded $2 million to Tenant.351 The
jury also ruled against Landlord on its breach of contract claim.352 On
appeal, Landlord challenged the propriety of the directed verdict against it.353
The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the directed verdict under the
authority of section 83.05(2) of the Florida Statutes, which sets out the only
methods by which a landlord may repossess, leased premises from a
defaulting tenant.354 The methods are by an action based on section 83.20 or
other civil action that determines the right to possession, or where the tenant
has surrendered or abandoned the rented space.355 Landlord did not employ
any of the approved eviction methods, and the self-help provisions in the
lease agreement availed the Landlord nothing.356 Tenant also challenged the
trial judge’s decision not to award pre-judgment interest on the eviction
damages award.357 The Fourth District held that since Tenant received an
award purely of a fixed amount of money damages, the trial court had no
discretion in the matter and should have awarded pre-judgment interest
“from the date of the loss or the accrual of [the] cause of action.”358 Tenant,
however, did not fare as well on the issue of the $2 million in damages
awarded on its conversion claim.359 Conversion requires the exercise of
control over and acts that are not consistent with “another’s possessory rights
in personal property.”360 There was lack of proof to support the award.361
opinion how Tenant’s employees were still in the restaurant, which was padlocked several
days earlier, but there were other leased areas including an atrium, a ballroom, and two
meeting rooms, which may be where the employees were. See id.
349.
Id.
350.
Id.
351.
Id.
352.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44.
353.
See id.
354.
Id. at 44–45; see also FLA. STAT. § 83.05(2) (2006).
355.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44–45;
see also FLA. STAT. § 83.05(2), 83.20 (2006).
356.
See Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 45.
357.
Id. at 46.
358.
See id. (quoting Bosem v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 46 (Fla.
2010) (per curiam)).
359.
See id. at 45–47.
360.
Id. at 45 (quoting Joseph v. Chanin, 940 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2006)).
361.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 46.
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Furthermore, the court held that “‘an action in tort is inappropriate where the
basis of the suit is a contract, either express or implied.’”362 The directed
verdict, as to the eviction damages, was affirmed, the conversion damages
award was reversed, and the denial of pre-judgment interest on eviction
award was reversed and remanded.363
Landlord raised an interesting argument in support of its position
that the directed verdict on the wrongful eviction claim was improper.364
The argument was that this was not a total eviction, but rather just a partial[]
evict[ion], since Tenant was not locked out of all of the leased premises. 365
The court responded that “[a]lthough the issue of whether a tenant can be
partially evicted appears to be an issue of first impression in Florida, we
need not address it here.”366 The court then stated that it found “no evidence
to support Landlord’s contention that it intended to allow Tenant to use that
part of the leasehold . . . or that Tenant could still maintain its other business
operations without the restaurant.”367
C.

Torts
1.

Construction Defects: Applicable Statute of Limitation

Almost ten years after the closing on property upon which Lennar
Homes (“Builder”) constructed a home for the homeowner (“Purchaser”),
Builder was served by Purchaser with the required notice pursuant to Section
558 of the Florida Statutes.368 Purchaser subsequently filed suit against
Builder alleging home construction defects.369 When the suit was filed, more
than ten years had elapsed since the date of the closing, and Builder defended
citing section 95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes, the ten-year statute of
repose applicable to construction defect claims.370 Section 95.11(3)(c)
provides, in part, that
362.
Id. (quoting Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar, 243 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1970)).
363.
Id. at 47.
364.
Id. at 45.
365.
Id.
366.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 45.
367.
Id.
368.
Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC, 219 So. 3d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2017); see also FLA. STAT. § 558.004 (2016). Section 558.004(1) of the Florida Statutes
requires that in cases of construction defect claims not involving personal injury, a claimant,
“at least [sixty] days before filing” suit, is required to serve a “written notice of claim on the
contractor.” FLA. STAT. § 558.004(1).
369.
Busch, 219 So. 3d at 94–95.
370.
Id. at 94; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2016).
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“[i]n any event, the action must be commenced within [ten] years
after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the
issuance of a certificate of occupancy, . . . the date of completion
or termination of the contract between the professional engineer,
registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer,
371
whichever date is latest.”

Builder claimed that the contract was complete as of the closing so
the ten-year period started to run at closing of the sale which would mean
that the period had expired.372 The complaint was dismissed, and Purchaser
appealed.373 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed the contract
attached to the complaint that contained language indicating that it was
possible for the contract not to be completed until after closing, and the court
ruled that “[b]ecause the contract expressly contemplated that closing could
occur even if work required by the contract remained incomplete, and the
complaint did not allege that no work was completed after closing, the
allegations of the complaint do not conclusively establish that the contract
was completed upon closing.”374 In other words, the District Court
concluded that the complaint failed to conclusively establish that the ten-year
period started to run at closing.375 Therefore, the complaint should not have
been dismissed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded.376
On a related note, in Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster
Specialty Insurance Co.,377 the United States Court of Appeal for the
Eleventh Circuit certified the following question of first impression to the
Supreme Court of Florida: “Is the notice and repair process set forth in
Chapter 558 of the Florida Statutes a suit within the meaning of the
[commercial general liability] policies issued by [insurance company] to
[contractor]?”378
While it is impossible to predict how the Supreme Court of Florida
will decide Altman Contractors, Inc., or whether that decision dealing with
insurer’s duty to defend will have an impact on construction defect claims
subject to section 95.11(3)(c), or the tolling statute under section 558.004(10)
of the Florida Statutes, remains to be seen.379 The latter section provides that
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c).
Busch, 219 So. 3d at 95.
Id.
Id. at 95–96 (emphasis added).
See id. at 94.
Id. at 94, 96.
832 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1326.
See id.; FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2016); FLA. STAT. § 558.004(10)

(2016).
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service by a claimant of written notice of claim under section 558.004(1)
“tolls the applicable statute of limitations.”380 It should be noted that there is
no express reference in section 558.004(10) to the statute of repose contained
in section 558.004(1).381
2.

Slip and Fall: Invitee, Uninvited Licensee, or Trespasser

While walking home at about 11:00 P.M., after an evening out, Mrs.
Arp (“Mrs. Arp”) took a cut through shortcut “over a pathway of paver
stones located in the area of a utility easement on property owned by W.E.
Association and operated as a shopping center.”382 Plaintiff stepped on a
cracked stone, turned her ankle, and fell.383 “The [shortcut] did not have a
No Trespassing sign,” and Plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that she
witnessed other people taking the shortcut regularly.384 She did not go into
any of the shopping center stores that evening, and was using the shortcut
“because she ‘just wanted to get home.’”385 She sued Waterway East
Association, Inc. (“Waterway”), among others, alleging negligence.386 The
trial court granted Waterway’s motion for summary judgment, and the
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.387 The appellate court first noted
that under common law, there are three categories of persons who enter onto
private property, specifically, “an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.”388
After defining the invitee as “a visitor on the premises by invitation, either
express or reasonably implied, of the owner,” the district court defined “[a]n
uninvited licensee [as] a person who chooses ‘to come upon the premises
solely for [his or her] own convenience without invitation either expressed or
reasonably implied under the circumstances.’”389 The district court defined a
trespasser as one “who enters the premises of another without license,
invitation, or other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose of his own,
or at his convenience, or merely as an idler with no apparent purpose, other

380.
381.
382.

FLA. STAT. § 558.004(1), (10).
See id.
Arp v. Waterway E. Ass’n, 217 So. 3d 117, 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

2017).
383.
Id.
384.
Id.
385.
Id.
386.
Id.
387.
Arp, 217 So. 3d at 119, 122.
388.
Id. at 120.
389.
Id. at 120–21 (alteration in original); see also Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d
691, 695 (Fla. 1973) (explaining the difference between licensees by invitation and uninvited
licensee).
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than perhaps to satisfy his curiosity.”390 To the trespasser and uninvited
licensee, the court concluded, “[t]he only duty a [property owner] owes . . . is
‘to avoid willful or wanton harm to him and, upon discovery of his presence,
to warn him of any known dangers which would not be open to his ordinary
observation.’”391 The facts did not show that Waterway breached its duty to
Mrs. Arp, who “was, at best, an uninvited licensee.”392
3.

Slip and Fall: No Notice

Ms. Wilson-Greene (“Plaintiff”) brought a negligence action related
to a fall that occurred in a City of Miami owned building.393 The
maintenance contract for the building was between the City of Miami and
Vista Maintenance Services, Inc.394 Plaintiff testified that she had business
on the second floor, which Plaintiff said took more than fifteen minutes, and
that she used the elevator from the second floor to return to the lobby.395 Her
testimony was to the effect that when she stepped off the elevator, she
slipped on a green substance, fell, hit her head, lost consciousness, and when
she became conscious again, she had a green substance on her body that was
not hot.396 Plaintiff testified that “[s]he did not see any substance on the
floor before she entered the elevator” in the same group of elevators to go up
to the second floor.397 Plaintiff lost on a motion for summary judgment and
she appealed.398 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
the language of the contract between the defendants, the City of Miami and
Vista Maintenance Services, Inc., “did not create a contractual duty on Vista
[Maintenance Services, Inc. to] constantly . . . patrol the building” for
dangerous conditions.399 Neither the City of Miami nor Vista Maintenance
Services, Inc. had actual notice of the dangerous condition, and a permissible
inference of constructive notice was not supported by the facts.400 The

390.

Arp, 217 So. 3d at 121 (quoting Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla.

1972)).
391.
Ct. App. 1980)).
392.
393.
App. 2017).
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
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Id. at 120 (quoting Nolan v. Roberts, 383 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Id. at 121–22.
Wilson-Greene v. City of Miami, 208 So. 3d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilson-Greene, 208 So. 3d at 1273.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275.
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district court distinguished melting substances from hot substances, which
“requires a jury to impermissibly stack inferences,”401 stating:
We conclude that where melting substances are involved,
there is no need to infer the substance was previously frozen.
Logic tells us that is a given. In the instant case, the jury first
would need to infer that the substance was hot prior to spilling on
the floor and infer from this that it was on the floor for a sufficient
402
amount of time for it to have cooled.

The district court held that “[t]he mere presence of soup which is
‘not hot’ on the floor is not enough to establish constructive notice.”403 Nor
was there actual notice.404 The court noted that the contract did not have the
type of language that would have required a heightened duty of care on the
part of Vista Management Services, Inc.405
D.

UCC and Other Debtor-Creditor Disputes
1.

Perfected Security Interest

In Beach Community Bank v. Disposal Services, LLC,406 Beach
Community Bank (“Creditor”) held a perfected security interest under the
Uniform Commercial Code in certain containers that secured a debt owed to
Creditor by Solid Waste Haulers (“Debtor”).407 Debtor sold the containers to
Disposal Services, LLC (“Transferee”), but Debtor did not apply the sales
proceeds to its debt to Creditor.408 Debtor eventually defaulted on payments
to Creditor, and Creditor then made written demand of Transferee that it pay
Debtor’s debt in full or turn over the containers to Creditor.409 Transferee
did neither, and Creditor sued Transferee alleging conversion of the
containers.410 On motion by Transferee, the trial court entered an order
granting summary judgment in favor of Transferee, opining that Creditor
could not sue for conversion because the remedy of replevin was still
available to it.411 Creditor appealed and the First District Court of Appeal
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Id. at 1276.
Id.
Wilson-Greene, 208 So. 3d at 1275.
Id.
Id. at 1274.
199 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
Id. at 1133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1133–34.
Beach Cmty. Bank, 199 So. 3d at 1134.
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reversed.412 Creditor had alleged in its complaint all of the elements
necessary to sustain a cause of action for conversion.413 “When an
unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured party has numerous
cumulative remedies at its disposal; it is not forced to elect a single
remedy.”414
2.

Assignment of Accounts Receivable

The Florida Department of Transportation (“DOT”) contracted with
Arbor One, Inc. (“Assignor”) for certain work to be done.415 Assignor sold
to United Capital Funding Corp. (“Assignee”) Assignor’s accounts
receivable from the DOT.416 Assignee, pursuant to section 679.4061 of the
Florida Statutes, notified the DOT in writing, of the assignment and the
amount of the receivables and advised the DOT to make contract payments
due to Assignee—not to Assignor.417 The DOT continued to pay
Assignor.418 Assignee sued the DOT and obtained a summary judgment
declaring the DOT to be legally obligated to Assignee for payment of the
Arbor One accounts receivable.419 The Second District Court of Appeal
affirmed, concluding that the DOT was an account debtor like any other
subject to the above cited statute.420 The court also determined that the DOT
did not come within the so-called transfer exception of sections 679.1091 to
679.4061(1).421 Finally, the Second District ruled that the DOT’s claim of
sovereign immunity was barred by section 337.19(1) of the Florida
Statutes.422
3.

Homestead Sales Proceeds

JBK Associates, Inc. v. Sill Bros., Inc.423 involved a judgment
creditor’s claim to the proceeds of the sale of the judgment debtor’s
412.
Id. at 1135.
413.
Id.
414.
Id.
415.
Dep’t of Transp. v. United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d 126, 128
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
416.
Id.
417.
Id. at 128–29; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.4061 (2012).
418.
United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d at 129.
419.
Id.
420.
Id. at 130, 136.
421.
Id. at 133, 136; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.1091, .4061(1).
422.
United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d at 136; see also FLA. STAT. §
337.19(1) (2012).
423.
191 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 2016).
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homestead.424 Creditor obtained a judgment against debtor in 2010.425 In
2013, due to Debtor’s divorce, the marital homestead was sold and Debtor’s
portion of the proceeds was deposited in a [Florida] Homestead Account
(“Account”) at Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC (“Garnishee”).426 The account
was subdivided into a cash portion and two securities portions.427 The
account was kept separate from Debtor’s other assets.428 In 2014, Creditor
served writs of garnishment on Garnishee in an effort to apply the assets of
the account toward satisfaction of its judgment.429 In the trial court, Debtor
successfully moved to have the writs dissolved.430 The trial court’s order
was affirmed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal on the strength of the
Supreme Court of Florida’s decision431 in Orange Brevard Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. La Croix.432 The Fourth District’s decision was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Florida.433 The Supreme Court reiterated the basic
principle that proceeds from the sale of one’s Florida homestead continues to
enjoy protection from the claims of most creditors and provided:
(1) [T]here must be a good faith intention, prior to and at the time
of the sale, to reinvest the proceeds in another homestead within a
reasonable time; (2) [t]he funds must not be commingled with
other monies; (3) [t]he proceeds must be kept separate and apart
and held for the sole purpose of acquiring another home. 434

The Court found that Debtor had kept faith with the requirements of
Orange Brevard Plumbing and Heating.435

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id.
JBK Assocs., Inc., 191 So. 3d at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id.
137 So. 2d 201 (Fla 1962).
JBK Assocs., Inc., 191 So. 3d at 882.
Id. at 881.
Id.
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